The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between various conditions implying essential undecidability: our main result is that there exists a theory T in which all partially recursive functions are representable, yet T does not interpret Robinson's theory R. To this end, we borrow tools from model theory-specifically, we investigate model-theoretic properties of the model completion of the empty theory in a language with function symbols. We obtain a certain characterization of ∃∀ theories interpretable in existential theories in the process.
Introduction
First-order theories studied by logicians may be broadly divided in two classes. One class comprises theories of "arithmetical strength", such as various fragments and extensions of Peano arithmetic, or set theories. They are distinguished by their great expressive power that, on the one hand, allows them to work with all kinds of objects from mathematical practice in suitable encoding (indeed, some of these theories are designed to serve as foundation for all of mathematics, e.g., ZFC), and on the other hand, makes them subject to Gödel's incompleteness theorems and related phenomena. The other class are theories of "tame" structures, for example algebraically closed or real closed fields, vector spaces, generic structures such as the random graph, etc. These theories have low expressive power (often manifested in classification of definable sets stemming from partial quantifier elimination), and consequently their models have a manageable structure of geometric nature. Tame theories tend to be decidable.
The borderline between arithmetical and tame theories is not sharply demarcated, but one typical feature of arithmetical theories is their essential undecidability, meaning that all consistent extensions of the theory are undecidable. This notion was isolated by Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson [9] . This classic monograph also includes convenient methods for proving essential undecidability of a theory T , which can be viewed as stand-alone properties implying essential undecidability. In order of increasing strength, these are:
• T can represent all partially recursive functions (prf; see below for a precise definition).
• T can interpret Robinson's theory R.
• T can interpret Robinson's arithmetic Q, or equivalently, the adjunctive set theory. * Supported by grant IAA100190902 of GA AVČR, Center of Excellence CE-ITI under the grant P202/12/G061 of GAČR, and RVO: 67985840.
An even stronger condition is that of being an sequential theory [7, 11] .
Recall that Robinson's R is, essentially, a theory axiomatizing the true Σ 1 sentences of the standard model of arithmetic N; while it is in some ways less convenient to work with than the better-known arithmetic Q (e.g., R is not finitely axiomatizable), it is distinguished by its interpretability properties-see Visser [12] .
The above-mentioned conditions on theories form an increasing chain. For most of the inclusions in this chain, it is clear (or at least, reasonably well known) that the inclusions are strict: in particular, there are theories interpreting Q that are not sequential (in fact, Q itself is such a theory [10] ), R does not interpret Q (as Q is a finitely axiomatized theory with no finite model, whereas R is locally finitely satisfiable), and there are essentially undecidable recursively axiomatized theories that do not represent prf. However, one of these inclusions is not as easy to resolve, leading to the question that motivated this paper:
Question 1.1 If a theory represents all partial recursive functions, does it interpret Robinson's theory R?
This may look plausible at first sight: R is a very weak theory that only fixes the values of elementary arithmetic operations on standard natural numbers, and requires virtually nothing else from the rest of the model. Now, the definition of representability of prf does provide for natural number constants and definable functions on them that behave like elementary arithmetic operations as these operations are prf, so everything seems to be in order.
Despite this, the answer turns out to be negative. The devil is in the "virtually nothing else": R does, after all, involve universally quantified conditions that may look innocuous (in our favourite formulation of R, these universal quantifiers are bounded by a constant, hence ostensibly "finite"), but actually turn out to be crucially important. Using Visser's [12] characterization, R interprets nontrivial universal theories such as the theory of infinite discrete linear order. In contrast, prf can be represented in a theory axiomatized purely by quantifier-free sentences, with no universal quantifiers lurking behind.
We are going to prove that consistent theories with quantifier-free-or even existential-axioms cannot interpret infinite linear orders and a couple of similar universal theories, and a fortiori, cannot interpret R. This is not easy to work out directly: the weakness of existential theorieswhich should intuitively be the reason for nonexistence of such interpretations-backfires in that we have absolutely no control over the complexity of formulas that make up potential interpretations, and over the sets they define in models.
Our strategy to solve this problem is to consistently extend the interpreting theory to a theory with quantifier elimination, using the fact that the empty theory in an arbitrary language L has a model completion (which we denote EC L , being the theory of existentially closed L-structures). This fact is well known for relational languages, in which case EC L is the theory of the "random L-structure". However, we need it for languages with function symbols, which case is mostly neglected in common literature, though the existence of EC L was proved in full generality already by Winkler [14] .
It follows that if a theory is interpretable in a consistent quantifier-free or existential theory, it is weakly interpretable in EC L for some L, and the interpretation can be taken quantifier-free. In order to see that this is heading in the right direction, we establish a converse result: if an ∃∀ theory is weakly interpretable in EC L , it is interpretable in a quantifier-free theory.
We proceed to prove that EC L does not, actually, weakly interpret various theories of interest. At this point, we are heading further and further into model theory, having left the realm of arithmetical theories. It turns out that our non-interpretability results can be naturally expressed in the language of classification theory. Arising through the work of Shelah [8] , classification theory studies the landscape of "dividing lines" between tame and wild theories, and their structural consequences. Many dividing lines have the following form: a theory is wild if it has a model that contains a certain complex combinatorial arrangement. Usually, conditions of this form can be reformulated as (weak) interpretability of a specific ∃∀ theory. For a concrete example, a theory T has the strict order property (SOP) if there exists a model M T , a formula ϕ(x, y), and tuples a n ∈ M for n ∈ N such that ϕ defines in M a strict partial order, and ϕ(a n , a m ) whenever n < m. Otherwise, T is said to have the no-strict-order property (NSOP).
We observe that theories that can represent recursive functions, as well as consistent extensions of EC L for sufficiently rich languages L, are moderately wild in that they always have the tree property TP 2 . However, we will prove that EC L (for arbitrary L) has certain tameness properties: specifically, it has the no-strong-order property NSOP 3 (which implies NSOP), and it has elimination of infinity. Using a characterization of NSOP 1 theories by Chernikov and Ramsey [2] , we show that it even has the NSOP 1 property. On the other hand, theories interpreting R are firmly on the wild side of all generally considered dividing lines.
For completeness, the paper also includes discussion of basic model-theoretic properties of EC L in the appendix.
Preliminaries
Let us first agree on a few bits of general notation. We will use N and ω more or less interchangeably to denote the set of nonnegative integers; N may also denote the standard model of arithmetic N, 0, succ, +, ·, < . We denote sequences by angle brackets, and consider them indexed starting from 0; tuples of finite-but-unspecified length will be denoted by placing a bar over a variable name, so that x may stand for the n-tuple x 0 , . . . , x n−1 .
We will write F : X ⇀ Y to denote that F is a partial function from X to Y . (We use this notation in the context of partial recursive functions, so virtually always we will have X = N k , Y = N.)
The notation t ≏ s means that t and s are syntactically identical terms; we may also apply it to formulas and other syntactic objects.
Theories and interpretations
In this paper, a language consists of an arbitrary number of relation and function symbols of arbitrary finite arity (including 0: nullary functions are constants, nullary relations are propositional variables). A theory is a deductively closed set of sentences in a particular language. A theory in language L is also called an L-theory. We will often consider theories specified by a set of axioms, in which case the theory is taken to be their deductive closure; we will frequently omit outer universal quantifiers from axioms. We will generally employ a form of first-order logic that allows empty models.
Many considerations in this paper revolve around the notion of interpretation of one theory in another, so we need to be somewhat specific about its meaning. However, since a precise technical definition of interpretations would get quite lengthy, we advise the reader to consult e.g. Visser [12, §2] for the details if necessary; we will only indicate the main distinctive features below. Let T be a theory in a language L T , and S a theory in a language L S . In its most simple form, a translation I of language L T into language L S is specified by:
• An L S -formula δ I (x) denoting the domain of I.
• For each relation symbol R of L T , as well as the equality relation =, an L S -formula R I of the same arity.
• For each function symbol F of L T of arity k, an L S -formula F I of arity k + 1.
If ϕ is an L T -formula, its I-translation ϕ I is an L S -formula constructed as follows: we rewrite the formula in an equivalent way so that function symbols only occur in atomic subformulas of the form F (x) = y, where x i , y are variables; then we replace each such atomic formula with F I (x, y), we replace each atomic formula of the form R(x) with R I (x), and we restrict all quantifiers and free variables to objects satisfying δ I . We take care to rename bound variables to avoid variable capture during the process.
A translation I of L T into L S is an interpretation of T in S if S proves:
• For each function symbol F of L T , the formula expressing that F I is total on δ I :
• The I-translations of all axioms of T , and axioms of equality.
It follows that S proves the I-translations of all sentences provable in T . The simplified picture of translations and interpretations above actually describes only onedimensional, parameter-free, and one-piece translations. In the full generality, we allow the following:
• Translations may be multi-dimensional. That is, we use n-tuples of L S -objects to represent L T -objects (where n is a fixed natural number, called the dimension of the translation): thus, δ I has n free variables, R I has kn free variables for a k-ary relation R ∈ L T , and similarly for functions; and when constructing ϕ I , each quantifier is replaced with a block of n quantifiers.
• Translations may use parameters. This means that the formulas δ I , R I , and F I may include parameter variables w that are assumed distinct from any proper variables used in the target formulas, and the specification of I includes an L S -formula π I (w) that describes which parameters are admissible. Parameters carry through the translation unchanged, so they appear as free variables in ϕ I . The definition of interpretation is modified so that S proves ∀w (π I (w) → ϕ I (w)) for each axiom ϕ, and likewise for (1).
• Translations may be piece-wise: the interpreted domain of L T -objects may be stitched together from finitely many pieces (possibly of different dimensions, and possibly overlapping). Each piece has its own δ I formula, there is a separate R I formula for each choice of a sequence of pieces for the arguments of R, etc.
A translation I is called unrelativized if, on each piece, δ I (x) is a tautologically true formula, and it has absolute equality if, on each piece, x = I y is the formula i x i = y i . Under suitable conditions, we do not need the full generality of interpretations:
• Assume that S proves the existence of at least two distinct objects. Then whenever T has an interpretation in S, it also has a one-piece interpretation. (The new interpretation may have larger dimension, but needs no extra parameters.) This can be achieved by using the pattern of equalities on an extra tuple of variables to distinguish pieces. For this reason, we will mostly think of interpretations as one-piece, to avoid unnecessary technical baggage.
• If T has a definable object, then an interpretation of T in S may be converted to an unrelativized interpretation by "equating" tuples outside the original domain with the definable object. If we do not mind using extra parameters, the same can be achieved even if T just proves the existence of at least one object. This construction may not be always desirable, hence relativized interpretations will remain the norm for us.
• A theory S has (non-functional) pairing if there is a formula π(x, y, z) such that S proves
If T has an interpretation in a theory S with pairing, it also has a one-dimensional interpretation, as we can use single elements to code tuples.
If I 1 is a translation of language L 1 into L 0 , and I 2 a translation of language L 2 into L 1 , the composition I 1 • I 0 is a translation of L 2 into L 0 , and it is defined in an expected way. Note that if I 1 is an interpretation of a theory T 1 in T 0 , and I 2 an interpretation of
Let T and S be theories. Some variants on the notion of interpretation of T in S are:
• A weak interpretation of T in S is an interpretation of T in a consistent extension of S (in the same language as S), or equivalently, in a completion of S.
•
• A faithful interpretation of T in S is an interpretation of T in S that is at the same time a cointerpretation of S in T .
A theory T is interpretable (weakly interpretable, cointerpretable) in a theory S if there exists an interpretation (weak interpretation, cointerpretation, resp.) of T in S. If T and S are complete theories, a translation I of L T in L S is an interpretation of T in S iff it is a weak interpretation iff (assuming I is parameter-free) it is a cointerpretation of S in T .
Lemma 2.1 If I is a weak interpretation of U in T , and J a cointerpretation of S in T , then J • I is a weak interpretation of U in S.
An interpretation I of T in S, as defined, is a syntactic transformation of formulas provable in T into formulas provable in S. However, it can be also viewed semantically: it provides a uniform way of building "internally definable" models of T out of models of S.
Assume first I is a parameter-free one-piece interpretation with absolute equality, and let M S. We construct a model M
. . , a k−1 )}, and similarly, a k-ary function symbol F ∈ L T is realized by the function whose graph is the subset of (δ I (M )) k+1 defined in M by the formula F I . Next, if I does not have absolute equality, we build the structure as before, and let M I be its quotient by the binary relation defined on it by the formula = I ; this relation is in fact a congruence, as S proves the translations of equality axioms.
If I is a piece-wise interpretation, we construct the domain of M I as the disjoint union of the finitely many pieces, each defined as above; we define relations and functions in the appropriate way.
Finally, if I is an interpretation with parameters, we will not obtain a single model M I , but one model for each choice of parameters: that is, if a is a tuple such that M π I (a), then M I,a is a model of T built from the expanded structure M, a by the procedure above.
Representation of recursive functions
The notion of representable 1 predicates and functions in first-order theories was introduced in [9] . We summarize it below, with a few inessential modifications. (Warning: we are going to relax the definition a bit later in this section.) Definition 2.2 Let T be a theory in a language L, and σ = {n : n ∈ N} a fixed sequence of numerals: i.e., a sequence of closed terms n such that
A set R of prf and rp is representable in T if there exists a sequence of numerals σ such that each member of R is representable in T w.r.t. σ.
In fact, [9] only consider representation of total recursive functions (trf), but it can be obviously generalized to partial functions in the indicated fashion. Likewise, we can generalize representation of rp to representation of disjoint pairs of r.e. predicates (dprp): such a disjoint pair P + , P − , where
for all n 0 , . . . , n k−1 ∈ N. We identify any relation P ⊆ N k with the disjoint pair P, N k P . Notice that a representation of a rp P ⊆ N k is essentially the same as a representation of its characteristic function χ P : N k → N; likewise for disjoint pairs (their characteristic functions are partial). Consequently, representability of all prf in T implies representability of all trf and representability of all dprp; in turn, either of the latter two properties implies representability of all rp.
The definition of representation of functions does not demand anything from ϕ(x, y) when x is not one of the tuples n in the domain of the original function. However, if ϕ(x, y) represents a partial function F : N k ⇀ N in T , we may define
Then ϕ ′ and ϕ ′′ also represent F in T ; moreover, ϕ ′ is T -provably a partial function, and ϕ ′′ is T -provably a total function. Thus, we could have included either condition in the definition with no ill effects.
A desirable condition that we did not include in the definition is that the sequence of numerals σ be recursive: that is, we can compute the term n on input n. For most purposes, this is actually redundant if T can represent recursive functions with respect to σ: using a formula representing the (recursive) successor function succ(n) = n+ 1, we can build a recursive sequence of formulas ϕ n (x) that define n. Definition 2.2 formally makes sense for representation of arbitrary predicates or partial functions in T . However, there is little point in that: if T is recursively axiomatizable, and the given numeral sequence is recursive (or if we can represent succ), then all predicates and total functions represented in T are actually recursive, and each partial function represented in T extends to a partial recursive function represented in T . (This is not necessarily true for non-recursive numeral sequences, see Proposition C.2.)
The primary reason for discussing representability of recursive functions in [9] is that it implies essential undecidability. We include the argument below for completeness.
Proposition 2.3
If the set of all unary rp is representable in a theory T w.r.t. a recursive sequence of numerals, then T is essentially undecidable.
Proof: Let S ⊇ T be decidable. This makes the predicate P (n) ⇐⇒ n is the Gödel number of a formula ϕ(x) s.t. S ⊢ ¬ϕ(n) recursive, hence P is represented in S by a formula ϕ(x). Let n = ϕ be its Gödel number. If ¬P (n), then S ⊢ ¬ϕ(n) by representability, hence P (n) by the definition of P , which is a contradiction. Thus, P (n). Then S ⊢ ¬ϕ(n) by the definition of P , and S ⊢ ϕ(n) by representability, hence S is inconsistent.
Again, the assumption of recursivity of the numeral sequence in Proposition 2.3 may be replaced with representability of succ. However, it cannot be dropped entirely, as shown in the appendix (Propositions C.2 and C.3).
Likewise, it is essential in Proposition 2.3 that all unary rp are representable at once: we show in Proposition C.1 that any finite (or uniformly recursive) set of rp and trf is representable in a decidable theory. In contrast, there is one fixed unary dprp (or: prf) whose representability in a theory w.r.t. a recursive numeral sequence implies essential undecidability: in fact, any recursively inseparable pair has this property.
The reader may have realized that representation of recursive functions and predicates in T amounts to an interpretation of a particular theory in T . We now make this connection explicit. Definition 2.4 Let R be a set of prf and dprp. The language L R consists of constants {n : n ∈ N}, function symbols F of appropriate arity for every prf F ∈ R, and likewise relation symbols P for every dprp P ∈ R. The theory REP R in language L R is axiomatized by
F (n 0 , . . . , n k−1 ) = m for each k-ary function F ∈ R, and n 0 , . . . , n k−1 , m ∈ N such that F (n) = m; and for each k-ary disjoint pair P = P + , P − ∈ R, the axioms
for n 0 , . . . , n k−1 ∈ P + , and ¬P (n 0 , . . . , n k−1 ) for n 0 , . . . , n k−1 ∈ P − . This definition also applies to rp P ⊆ N k using their identification with dprp P, N k P . Note that that the theory REP R is axiomatized by open (= quantifier-free) sentences. Let PRF, TRF, DPRP, and RP denote the sets of all prf, trf, dprp, and rp, respectively (where we consider TRF ⊆ PRF and RP ⊆ DPRP). Since REP DPRP is included in an extension of REP PRF by quantifier-free definitions, we will use REP PRF as a proxy for REP PRF∪DPRP .
For convenience, we also consider a finite-language formulation of REP PRF . Let U (x, y) be the prf defined by
where [n, m] denotes a recursive bijective pairing function N 2 → N (e.g., the Cantor pairing function (n + m)(n + m + 1)/2 + n), and φ n (m) an efficient numeration of unary prf. Let REP U be the fragment of REP PRF in the language 0, U ; it can be axiomatized by
Lemma 2.5 REP PRF is included in an extension of REP U by definitions of function symbols by terms, thus a theory interprets REP PRF iff it interprets REP U .
Proof:
We can read the definition of U backwards to obtain definitions of S, [x, y], and φ n (x) in terms of U and 0:
Using the above-mentioned fact that representations of (partial) functions may be assumed to be actual definable functions, we see: Observation 2.6 A set R of prf and dprp is representable in a theory T according to Definition 2.2 iff REP R is interpretable in T by a one-piece one-dimensional parameter-free interpretation I with absolute equality such that each n I is definable in T by a closed term. Now, the restrictions on the interpretation in Observation 2.6 are mostly irrelevant and arbitrary; as we are looking at the concept of representations from the viewpoint of interpretability, it seems we obtain a cleaner concept if we just drop them:
In particular, a theory T loosely represents all prf iff it interprets the theory REP U .
The theory R
Robinson's theory R was originally defined in [9] . Some inessential variants (mutually interpretable) of the theory appear in the literature; we prefer the following form in this paper. Definition 2.8 Let R denote the theory in the language L R = 0, succ, +, ·, < axiomatized by
for all n, m ∈ N, where n ≏ succ n (0).
(In particular, note that axiom (4) for n = 0 states ¬(x < 0).) It is easy to show that R implies n = m for distinct n, m ∈ N.
Observe that an L R -structure is a model of R iff it contains the standard model N as an initial (i.e., closed downward under <) substructure.
As usual, bounded quantifiers are introduced in L R as the short-hands
where t is a term not containing the variable y. An L R -formula ϕ(x) is ∆ 0 (or bounded ) if all quantifiers in ϕ are bounded. A formula is Σ 1 if it consists of a block of existential quantifiers followed by a ∆ 0 formula.
Proposition 2.9 R proves all Σ 1 sentences true in the standard model N. Conversely, it can be axiomatized by a set of true (universal ) ∆ 0 sentences.
As already proved in [9] (for the original, slightly stronger definition of the theory), R can represent recursive functions. We briefly sketch the argument below for completeness. Proposition 2.10 Every prf F : N k ⇀ N is representable in R by a Σ 1 formula w.r.t. the usual sequence of numerals as in Definition 2.8.
Proof: The graph { x, y : F (x) = y} is definable in N by a Σ 1 formula of the form ∃z ϑ(x, y, z), where ϑ ∈ ∆ 0 . Put
for any r ∈ N. We claim that ϕ represents F in R. Assume F (n) = m. On the one hand, ϕ(n, m) is a true Σ 1 sentence, and as such it is provable in R. On the other hand, fix r ∈ N that witnesses the z quantifier in N ϕ(n, m). Working in R, assume ϕ(n, y ′ ), we need to show y ′ = m. Let w ′ , z ′ witness the existential quantifiers in ϕ(n, y ′ ). Using (5), either w ′ equals a standard numeral, or w ′ > m, r. In the latter case, θ(n, m, r) implies y ′ = m as needed. In the former case, y ′ , z ′ < w ′ are also standard. It again follows that y ′ = m, as otherwise ¬θ(n, y ′ , z ′ ) would be a true ∆ 0 sentence, thus provable in R.
Consequently, R is essentially undecidable.
It is easy to see that R (therefore any theory interpretable in R) is locally finitely satisfiable, i.e., every finite subset has a finite model: indeed, if we identify all elements of N above b + 1, we obtain a model satisfying (2), (3), and (4) for n ≤ b. Visser [12] proved a striking converse to this observation: Theorem 2.11 Every locally finitely satisfiable, recursively axiomatizable theory in a finite language is interpretable in R, using a one-piece one-dimensional parameter-free interpretation.
Since relational ∃∀ sentences have the finite model property, this in particular implies that R interprets any consistent theory axiomatized by a recursive set of ∃∀ sentences in a finite relational language.
Model theory
Since this paper is intended to be accessible to a non-model-theoretic audience (and the author is not a model theorist either), it will only assume modest prerequisites in model theory-mostly common knowledge among logicians. The material needed should be covered by a textbook such as [3] , except that we will also need a few concepts from classification theory. We will review a few selected topics in more detail below.
First, let us start with a few basic conventions. Recall that we allow models to be empty, and that we denote finite tuples as x. For any structure M , we denote by Diag(M ) its diagram: the set of quantifier-free sentences true in M in the language of M augmented with constants for each element of M . By a slight abuse of language, we will also use this notation to denote the set of quantifier-free sentences true in M in its original language, if every element of M is the value of a closed term (i.e., if M is 0-generated).
Even though we normally work with one-sorted logic, the following construction is best thought of as yielding a multi-sorted structure. For any structure M , let M eq be the structure that has M itself as one of its sorts, and for each equivalence relation E(x, y) on M n definable without parameters in M , it has a sort whose elements are the equivalence classes of E; the structure includes the projection function to this sort from M n . It is easy to see that each such equivalence relation is definable in M by a formula that provably defines an equivalence relation in predicate logic; thus, the following makes sense: for any theory T , let T eq be the multi-sorted theory whose models are exactly the structures M eq for M T . (Officially, M eq and T eq can be coded in a suitable one-sorted language.) Note that T eq is interpretable in T , and any interpretation of another theory S in T can be made into an interpretation with absolute equality of S in T eq . Since we will work a lot with model completions, let us recall the related background. Let K be a class of structures in the same language. A model M ∈ K is existentially closed (e.c.) in K if for every model N ⊇ M such that N ∈ K, we have M 1 N : i.e., every existential formula with parameters from M which is satisfied in N is already satisfied in M . We will often speak of (absolutely) e.c. models without reference to K, in which case it is understood that K is the class of all models in the given language. An e.c. model of a theory T is an e.c. structure in the class of models of T . If T is a ∀∃-axiomatized theory, then every model M T embeds in an e.c. model of T . (More generally, this holds for any class K closed under limits of chains.)
A theory T is model-complete if all models M T are e.c. models of T ; this implies the stronger condition that for all M, N T , M ⊆ N implies M N . Equivalently, T is modelcomplete iff every formula ϕ is in T equivalent to an existential formula; it is enough to test this for universal formulas ϕ. A stronger condition is that T has quantifier elimination, meaning that every formula ϕ is in T equivalent to a quantifier-free formula; it is enough to test this for existential formulas ϕ with only one quantifier. Any model-complete theory T is axiomatizable by ∀∃ sentences.
Theories T and S in the same language are companions if every model of T embeds in a model of S, and vice versa; equivalently, T ∀ = S ∀ , where T ∀ denotes the universal fragment of T . A model companion of a theory T is a model-complete theory T * that is a companion of T . There are theories with no model companion (e.g., the theory of groups), but if a theory T has a model companion T * , it is unique: the models of T * are exactly the e.c. models of T ∀ . A theory has a model companion iff the class of e.c. models of T ∀ is elementary. Notice that a model companion of T is the same thing as a model companion of T ∀ , hence we can as well restrict attention to universal theories T .
If T is a theory, and ϕ(x) an existential formula, the resultant Res T ϕ is the set of all universal formulas ψ(x) such that T ⊢ ϕ(x) → ψ(x). For any structure M and a ∈ M , we then have: M Res T ϕ (a) iff M embeds in a model of T satisfying ϕ(a). It follows that the class of e.c. models of T is axiomatized by the following set of infinitary formulas:
A universal theory T has a model companion T * iff the resultants Res T ϕ are finitely axiomatizable (over T ) for all ϕ ∈ ∃ 1 , in which case (6) provides an explicit axiomatization of T * . A model completion of a theory T is a model companion T * of T such that for every M T , the theory T * + Diag(M ) is complete. Equivalently, a model companion T * of T is a model completion of T iff T has the amalgamation property (cf. Definition B.4). If T is a universal theory (which is the case we are primarily interested in), a companion T * of T is a model completion of T iff T * has quantifier elimination. A universal theory T has a model completion iff the resultant Res T ϕ is equivalent to a quantifier-free formula over T for every ϕ ∈ ∃ 1 .
For completeness, we also mention that every theory T has a unique Kaiser hull T KH , which is a largest ∀∃-axiomatized companion of T . Any e.c. model of T ∀ is also a model of T KH . If T has a model companion T * , then T * = T KH . A convenient trick when studying models of a complete theory T is to use monster models. A monster model of T is a model M T sufficiently rich so that all models we need to discuss can be assumed to be submodels of M; in order for this to work, we make M highly saturated: to be specific, let us posit that M is κ-saturated (i.e., every type over < κ parameters from M is realized in M) and strongly κ-homogeneous (i.e., every partial elementary self-map of M of size < κ extends to an automorphism of M), where κ is a "large" cardinal number (in particular, larger than the size of the language, as well as any models of T that we are going to encounter during the argument). This also implies that M is κ + -universal (every model of T of size ≤ κ elementarily embeds in M). (If it were not for foundational issues that we prefer not to be dragged into, we could even take M as an "Ord-saturated" model: a proper class model of T saturated w.r.t. types over any set of parameters.) Having fixed the monster model M, a small set is a subset of M of size < κ (likewise for sequences and other similar objects); a small model is an elementary submodel of M of size < κ.
Finally, let us introduce a few notions from classification theory. Classification theory was developed by Shelah [8] (and subsequently many others) as an elaboration of Morley's theory of stability; one of its main themes is identifying useful "dividing lines" between tame and wild theories. The dividing lines we are going to mention here are essentially of two kinds: first, variants of stability based on counting of types, and second, combinatorial properties based on the appearance of certain arrangements of points and definable sets in models.
While model theorists prefer to work with complete theories, the properties below are all stated in such a way that a theory T has a "tameness" property P iff every completion of T has property P . Also, it will be generally the case that T has a (tameness) property P iff every countable-language fragment of T has property P .
For an overview of inclusions among the properties below, see Figure 1 . Theory T is κ-stable if for every M T and A ⊆ M of size |A| ≤ κ, there are at most κ complete types over A. We say that T is stable if it is κ-stable for some infinite cardinal κ, and superstable if it is κ-stable for all sufficiently large cardinals κ. An even stronger condition is that T be totally transcendental ; officially, this means that every formula ϕ has Morley rank MR(ϕ) < ∞, but as we do not want to get into a definition of the rank, we can use the following characterization: T is totally transcendental iff all countable-language fragments of T are ω-stable.
For countable theories, ω-stability is equivalent to total transcendence, and implies κ-stability for all infinite cardinals κ; the class of ω-stable theories includes uncountably categorical theories, which in turn include strongly minimal theories (meaning that for all M T , the only subsets of M definable with parameters are finite or cofinite).
Concerning the second kind of tameness properties, we will start with an alternative definition of stability as the first example. A theory T has the order property (OP) if there exists a formula ϕ(x, y) (where x and y are tuples of the same length), a model M T , and a sequence of tuples
for all i, j ∈ ω; otherwise, T has the no-order property (NOP). It turns out that T has NOP if and only if it is stable. Beware of the terminological peculiarity that the base form of this condition on theories (OP) is "negative" (wild), whereas the corresponding "positive" (tame) condition is denoted as its negation (NOP). All properties below follow the same naming pattern.
A theory T has the independence property (IP) if there is a formula ϕ(x, y), a model M T , and tuples {a i : i ∈ ω} and {b I :
for all i ∈ ω and I ⊆ ω. Otherwise, T is NIP (also called dependent ).
A theory T has the strict order property (SOP) if there is a formula ϕ(x, y), a model M T , and tuples {a i : i ∈ ω} in M such that
for all i, j ∈ ω; equivalently, T is SOP iff there is a formula ϕ(x, y) that T -provably defines a strict partial order, and there is a model M T in which the partial order defined by ϕ has an infinite chain. Otherwise, T is NSOP.
A theory is stable (NOP) if and only if it is both NIP and NSOP. The class of theories that are NIP but SOP includes o-minimal theories (i.e., theories featuring a linear order < such that every definable subset of the universe is a union of finitely many intervals, possibly degenerate).
Recall that X <ω denotes the set of finite sequences with entries from X, ordered by the initial subsequence relation (which we write as t ⊆ s) to form an X-branching tree; X ω is the corresponding set of infinite sequences (which are branches of the tree). If s ∈ X <ω ∪ X ω , and n < lh(s), then s ↾ n is the initial subsequence of s of length n; if s ∈ X <ω and x ∈ X, then s x is s extended with a new entry x at the end. For clarity, we will write von Neumann numerals as n = {0, . . . , n − 1}.
A set of formulas is k-inconsistent if each k-element subset is inconsistent. A theory T has the tree property (TP) if there is a formula ϕ(x, y), a model M T , tuples {a s : s ∈ ω <ω } in M , and k ≥ 2 such that
• for each σ ∈ ω ω , the type {ϕ(x, a σ↾n ) : n < ω} is consistent, and
Otherwise, T is called NTP or simple. Simplicity is officially defined in terms of properties of forking, but it is equivalent to NTP; there is a related stronger condition called supersimplicity, see e.g. [13] . Stable theories are simple, and simple theories are NSOP. Superstable theories are exactly the stable supersimple theories.
The tree property has two important variants. A theory T has the tree property TP 1 if there is a formula ϕ(x, y), a model M T , and tuples {a s : s ∈ ω <ω } in M such that
• for each σ ∈ ω ω , {ϕ(x, a σ↾n ) : n < ω} is consistent, and
T has the tree property TP 2 if there is a formula ϕ(x, y), a model M T , and tuples {a n,i : n, i ∈ ω} in M such that
• for each σ ∈ ω ω , {ϕ(x, a n,σ(n) ) : n < ω} is consistent, and
• for each n, i, j ∈ ω such that i < j, {ϕ(x, a n,i ), ϕ(x, a n,j )} is inconsistent.
As usual, if T is not TP i , it is NTP i . A theory is NTP if and only if it is both NTP 1 and NTP 2 . All NIP theories are NTP 2 , and all NTP 1 theories are NSOP. The region between simple and NSOP theories is further stratified by levels of the strong order property. For k ≥ 3, a theory T has the strong order property SOP k if there is a formula ϕ(x, y), a model M T , and tuples
is inconsistent; otherwise, T has NSOP k . A theory T has the strong order property SOP ∞ if there are data as above such that (7) is inconsistent for all k ≥ 3; otherwise, T has NSOP ∞ . For any theory T , we have
We warn the reader that usage of the abbreviations (N)SOP ∞ and (N)SOP varies in the literature.
Notice that the definition of NSOP k above is only interesting for k ≥ 3, as stated: taking it blindly for k = 2 would give a condition equivalent to stability, and for k = 1 a condition false for any theory with infinite models. Instead, the names NSOP 1 and NSOP 2 were given ad hoc to variants of the tree property that fit nicely in the picture. Since NSOP 2 is equivalent to NTP 1 , we will not bother to define it separately. A theory T has property SOP 1 if there is a formula ϕ(x, y), a model M T , and tuples {a s : s ∈ 2 <ω } in M such that
• for each σ ∈ 2 ω , {ϕ(x, a σ↾n ) : n < ω} is consistent, and
otherwise, T is NSOP 1 . We have
for any theory T . We observe that each of the combinatorial properties above (NOP, NSOP, NIP, NTP 1,2 , NSOP k , NSOP ∞ ) can be expressed as weak non-interpretability of a particular recursively ∃∀-axiomatized theory in a finite relational language. (Incidentally, notice that any such theory is interpretable in R by Theorem 2.11, hence R is "wild" according to all of these dividing lines.)
For example, by compactness, a theory T has SOP iff it has a model with a definable strict order (on k-tuples, for some k) with arbitrarily long finite chains. It makes no difference if the defining formula is allowed extra parameters, or if we allow to relativize the domain of the order. Thus, T has SOP iff it has a completion that interprets the theory T SOP of strict orders with arbitrarily long chains, axiomatized by
For a more complicated example, T has TP 1 iff it weakly interprets the theory in a language with a single binary relation R(x, y), and axioms
for n ∈ ω.
Model completion of the empty theory
Recall that our original motivation was to find a theory T that represents prf, but does not interpret R. Now, the weaker T is, the lower its chances of interpreting R, so the obvious choice is to take T = REP PRF . This theory, axiomatized by quantifier-free sentences, essentially just states that the universe includes a copy of a certain model based on the integers; it does not take a big leap of faith to surmise it is too weak to interpret much of anything. It is, however, another matter to actually prove this. A possible strategy is to consider an arbitrary translation I of the language of R into REP PRF , and try to argue that in some models of REP PRF , R I is not valid. But here the weakness of REP PRF that we were hoping to exploit becomes our worst enemy: I may involve formulas of arbitrary high quantifier complexity that may potentially denote very complicated combinatorial properties, and we just have no handle how to understand them. What we need is that definable sets have manageable structure.
Ideally, we would like to extend REP PRF to a (consistent) theory T with full quantifier elimination. Now, a moment of reflection tells us that any possible configuration of finitely many functions on a finite set may be realized by suitable recursive functions, and as such should embed into a model of T . By compactness, any L PRF -structure should embed in a model of T , thus if such a T exists, it is unique: T must be the model completion of the empty theory in L PRF . (By the empty theory, we mean the theory with no extra-logical axioms.)
The model completion of the empty L-theory is well known and well understood for finite relational languages L. The theory can be axiomatized by a transparent set of "extension axioms", and it coincides with the set of all formulas that hold in random finite L-structures with asymptotic probability 1. The theory is ω-categorical, and its unique countable model is the countable random L-structure generalizing the Erdős-Rényi-Rado random graph; alternatively, it can be described as the Fraïssé limit of the class of all finite L-structures.
It is much less known that the model completion of the empty L-theory does, indeed, exist for arbitrary languages L, as we need here. This was proved by Winkler [14] as a corollary of more general results on model companions of Skolem expansions of model-complete theories. Note that for languages with functions, most of the above-mentioned properties of the theory of the random relational structure break down: first-order logic with functions has no 0-1 law (or even limit law) on finite structures, and there does not seem to be a sensible way of defining a probability distribution on functions on infinite sets; we will see that the model completion is not ω-categorical, and not locally finitely satisfiable.
We will now give a self-contained argument that the model completion exists, including an explicit axiomatization by extension formulas; this will also help us later to determine (syntactically) what open formulas are consistent with the theory. We will denote the model completion as EC L , as its models are exactly the (absolutely) existentially closed L-structures.
Definition 3.1 Let L be a finite language, and Θ be a finite set of L-terms closed under subterms such that the variables in Θ are among x 0 , . . . , x n−1 , y 0 , . . . , y m−1 . Let ε R t ∈ {0, 1} for every k-ary relation R ∈ L, and every t 0 , . . . , t k−1 ∈ Θ. Let ∼ be an equivalence relation on Θ such that:
(ii) If F ∈ L is k-ary, and t ≏ F (t) ∈ Θ and s ≏ F (s) ∈ Θ satisfy t i ∼ s i for each i < k, then t ∼ s.
Then the elementary existential formula ∃y θ Θ,∼,ε (x, y) is defined by
where
Lemma 3.2 Every existential formula ∃y θ(x, y) in a finite language L is equivalent to a disjunction of elementary existential formulas with the same free and bound variables.
Proof: Let Θ be the set of all subterms of θ(x, y), and Φ the set of all (finitely many) atomic formulas using terms from Θ. We can write θ in full disjunctive normal form in atoms Φ, and switch disjunctions with existential quantifiers. Each disjunct has the form (8), except for the conditions on ∼ and ε. However, it is easy to see that if ∼ is not an equivalence relation, or if (i) or (ii) is violated, then θ Θ,∼,ε is contradictory.
Definition 3.3 Let L, Θ, x, y, ∼, ε be as in Definition 3.1. We define a subset Ξ ⊆ Θ, and for each t ∈ Ξ a term t * (x), as follows:
(i) Every variable x i is in Ξ, and
(ii) If t ∼ s ∈ Ξ, then t ∈ Ξ, and t * ≏ s * .
(iii) If t ≏ F (t 0 , . . . , t k−1 ) ∈ Θ, and t 0 , . . . , t k−1 ∈ Ξ, then t ∈ Ξ, and t
If more than one clause applies to put t ∈ Ξ, we define t * using any of them; the choice does not matter. The only relevant property is the following observation:
for every t ∈ Ξ. Finally, we define an open formula θ * Θ,∼,ε (x) as t,s∈Ξ t∼s
Proposition 3.4 Let L, Θ, ∼, ε be as in Definition 3.1, M an L-structure, and u ∈ M . The following are equivalent.
Proof: (i) → (ii) follows immediately from the definitions and property (9) .
(ii) → (i): Put N = M∪ (Θ Ξ)/∼, and identify t/∼ with t
Using M θ * Θ,∼,ε (u) and the properties of ∼ and Ξ, it is easy to check that the definition is independent of the choice of representatives, and agrees with M if t 0 , . . . , t k−1 ∈ Ξ. We can thus extend the definition with the original structure of M , and then arbitrarily to the remaining tuples from N . The definition ensures N θ Θ,∼,ε (x/∼, y/∼),
In other words, Proposition 3.4 shows that θ * Θ,∼,ε is equivalent to the resultant of the elementary existential formula ∃y θ Θ,∼,ε (x, y) in the empty theory.
Proof: (i): Every extension of M ↾ L ′ can be expanded to an extension of M . (ii): Assume that M ⊆ N ϕ(u), where u ∈ M , and ϕ is an existential formula. Let L ′ ⊆ L be a finite sublanguage containing all symbols occurring in ϕ.
Definition 3.6 If L is a finite language, let EC L denote the theory axiomatized by the formulas
for all Θ, ∼, ε as in Definition 3.1 with m = 1. (i) EC L has elimination of quantifiers.
(ii) Models of EC L are exactly the existentially closed L-structures; in particular, every Lstructure embeds in a model of EC L .
Moreover, if L is recursively presented, then EC L is decidable.
Proof: By Lemma 3.5, we may assume that L is finite. (i): Proposition 3.4 implies the converse implications
for each axiom of EC L . In view of Lemma 3.2, this shows that every formula with one existential quantifier is equivalent to an open formula over EC L , hence the same follows for all formulas by induction on complexity.
(ii): Proposition 3.4 implies that any e.c. model validates EC L . The converse would also follow from Proposition 3.4, were it not for the restriction to m = 1 in the definition of EC L . However, if ϕ(x) is an existential formula, N ⊇ M EC L , and N ϕ(u) for some u ∈ M , we can assume N is e.c. by extending it further if necessary. Thus, N EC L , and M is an elementary substructure of N by (i), hence M ϕ(u).
As for decidability, EC L is clearly r.e., hence quantifier elimination is effective (in fact, the argument above gives an explicit algorithm). Now, if ϕ is a quantifier-free (or universal) sentence, then EC L ⊢ ϕ iff ∅ ⊢ ϕ iff ϕ holds in all finite models of cardinality bounded by the number of subterms t of ϕ: if M ϕ, let M 0 be the set of realizations of all such t in M , and make it an L-structure in such a way that realizations of all symbols agree with M whenever possible. Then M 0 ϕ.
is a decidable complete theory.
Interpretability in existential theories
As explained in the beginning of Section 3, our intention for discussing EC L is that we want to show noninterpretability of certain theories S in REP PRF (which is an existential-in fact, quantifier-free-theory) by showing their noniterpretability in completions of EC L . Now, it is not a priori clear if this strategy is any good: why should we expect that S is, indeed, not intepretable in an extension of EC L ? After all, EC L is a fairly nontrivial theory, hence it may interpret S even if no existential theory can; to begin with, it interprets EC L itself.
To allay our fears, we will prove in the present section that a large class of theories S is immune to such shenanigans: specifically, a theory axiomatized by ∃∀ sentences is interpretable in a completion of some EC L if and only if it is interpretable in a consistent quantifier-free or existential theory. We believe this characterization to be of independent interest, which is why we prove it in detail even though it is only of indirect relevance for our original goal, in that it assures us that we set off in the right direction; of course, we would eventually find that anyway when we got to the point.
We start with a few auxiliary lemmas whose basic intention is that if a theory is (weakly) interpretable in EC L , we can make L and the interpretation "nice".
(iii) If L contains a constant c, and F, R / ∈ L are a k-ary function and relation symbol (resp.),
(iv ) If L contains an at least binary function, or at least two unary functions, then EC L has pairing.
(ii) follows from (i) and the fact that an expansion of an e.c. model by constants is e.c. (iii): Let M EC L∪{F } , and ϕ(u) be an existential (L ∪ {R})-formula with u ∈ M , satisfied in an extension N ⊇ M I . We can extend If L contains a k-ary function F for k ≥ 2, we may use a similar argument with e.g.
and N = M∪ {c, F (c, . . . , c)}.
Definition 4.2 We will call a parameter-free translation quantifier-free if its domain, and the translations of all predicate symbols as well as equality are given by quantifier-free formulas, and the translations of all function symbols are given piecewise by terms, where the pieces are finitely many and quantifier-free definable.
Recall Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 4.3
For any language L, there is a quantifier-free one-piece one-dimensional parameterfree unrelativized cointerpretation with absolute equality of EC L2 in EC L , where L 2 consists of a single binary function, and at most |L| constants. If L is countable, one constant suffices.
Proof: Using Lemma 4.1 (iii) (which may be applied in parallel to all relations using the same argument), we may assume L contains no relations. Let L 2 be the language consisting of a binary function (x, y), the constants of L, and new constants c F for every nonconstant function F ∈ L.
For n ≥ 1, write (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) := (x 0 , (x 1 , . . . , (x n−2 , x n−1 ) . . .)).
Let I be the translation of L into L 2 defined by c I = c for constants c ∈ L, and
for n-ary functions F ∈ L, n > 0. Let
We will show that I is a faithful interpretation of EC L in EC * L2 , which implies it is also a cointerpretation of EC L2 in EC L . Proof: (i): Let K be the disjoint union M∪ M <ω , with constants realized as in N , and
(a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n ) K = a 0 , . . . , a n a 0 ∈ M,
We need to check that if F ∈ L is n-ary with n > 0, and a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ∈ M , then
We may assume a / ∈ N n , as otherwise the statement follows from N I ⊆ M . Let i < n be maximal such that a i / ∈ N , and i ′ = min{i, n − 2}. It follows from the definition that (a 0 , . . . , a n−1 , a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ) F , a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ), a 0 , . . . , a n−1 , a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ) K = F M (a 0 , . . . , a n−1 )
as required.
(ii): By extending M if necessary, we may assume |M | ≥ |L|, hence we can fix pairwise distinct elements c N F ∈ M . Put N = M∪ M <ω , and define
(a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n ) N = a 0 , . . . , a n a 0 ∈ M,
We Finally, let L be countable, and enumerate it as {F k : k ∈ ω}. Let L 2 be the language consisting of (x, y) and a single constant c. We modify the construction above as follows: we employ the closed terms c k = (. . . ((c, c), c) , . . . , c n + 2 times
).
in place of c F k , and if F k is a constant, we put
(In particular, we redefine EC * L2 to state that all the c k are pairwise distinct.) Then it is easy to check that the argument still goes through: the only place where the exact composition of c F matters is in the proof of part (ii) of the claim, and we can fix it e.g. by making N the set of all finite binary trees with leaves labelled by M∪ {c}, where a ∈ M is identified with a one-node tree, and (x, y) N is the tree whose root has children x, y, except for ((c k , a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ) N , (a 0 , . . . , a n−1 , a 0 , . . . , a n−1 )
as needed to make the interpretation work.
Corollary 4.4 If a theory
T is weakly interpretable in EC L for some L, it has a one-piece onedimensional parameter-free unrelativized interpretation in a consistent extension of some EC L2 , where L 2 consists of a binary function, and at most |L| constants. If L is countable, one constant suffices.
Proof: We can make the interpretation one-piece as EC L proves there are at least two elements. We can assume L contains a constant by Lemma 4.1 (i), and that it is purely functional by (iii). Then we can make the interpretation one-dimensional by (iv), and parameter-free by expanding L with constants for the parameters, using (ii). We can also assume to have a constant c denoting an element in the domain of the interpretation, and then it is easy to make the interpretation unrelativized by equating (i.e., extending the interpreted equality) elements outside the domain with c. Finally, we can compose the interpretation with the one from Lemma 4.3 to make the language as needed.
Note that the argument in Corollary 4.4 does not guarantee that the interpretation is quantifierfree: while the domain and the translations of all symbols can be made quantifier-free formulas just by quantifier elimination, this does not ensure function symbols are given piecewise by terms. This will in fact pose a serious challenge in the proof of the characterization below, and we will need results on elimination of imaginaries from Appendix A to deal with it.
Theorem 4.5 Let T be an ∃∀-axiomatized theory in a language L T . The following are equivalent.
(i) T is interpretable in a consistent existential theory.
(ii) T has a quantifier-free interpretation I in a consistent quantifier-free theory S such that I and the language of S obey the conditions in Corollary 4.4, except that I may be multidimensional if L T contains a proper function symbol.
(iii) T is weakly interpretable in EC L for some language L, w.l.o.g. obeying the same conditions as in (ii).
If L T is finite, and T is recursively axiomatized, we can also make the interpreting theories recursively axiomatized.
Proof: (ii) → (i) is trivial, and (i) → (iii) follows from the fact that every consistent existential theory is consistent with EC L in the same language by Theorem 3.7.
By expanding L and L T with Henkin constants for the existential quantifiers in axioms of T using Lemma 4.1 (ii), we may assume that T is universal. By Corollary 4.4, T has a one-piece one-dimensional parameter-free unrelativized interpretation J in a consistent theory EC L + S, where L consists of a binary function and constants. By quantifier elimination, we may assume S is a set of quantifier-free sentences, and the J-translations of equality and all symbols of L T are given by quantifier-free formulas. By expanding the language L further, we may assume that constants of L T are interpreted by constants (or constant terms) of L. In the countable case, we may apply Lemma 4.3 again to reduce the number of constants to one.
If L T contains proper function symbols, we need more work, as we cannot add Skolem functions in the same way as constants. As we will explain in the appendix, EC L has weak elimination of imaginaries, and as a corollary, we obtain in Proposition A.9 an explicit description of definable equivalence relations that we apply to = J . Using (13), we see that the collection of equivalence classes that make up the domain of J can be definably split in finitely many pieces, where the i-th piece is in definable bijection with a collection of m i -element sets of r-tuples (represented by an equivalence relation on m i r-tuples as in Definition A.1). The upshot is that we may replace J with an equivalent piece-wise interpretation I that almost has absolute equality, in the sense that all equivalence classes of = I have bounded finite size. Consequently, the translation F I of any function symbol F ∈ L T , when viewed as a relation on tuples rather than on their equivalence classes, is a total multifunction with only finitely many values. By Lemma A.2 and a compactness argument, there is a piecewise term-definable function that picks one possible value of such a multivalued function. Thus, I is a quantifier-free interpretation. Since we may assume L includes a pair of constants c, d such that S ⊢ c = d, we can make I a one-piece interpretation; it is still parameter-free, and we can make it unrelativized as above, but it may be multi-dimensional. (Lemma 4.1 does not give a pairing function, hence it is unclear if we can make the interpretation one-dimensional without sacrificing the property that translations of functions are piecewise termdefinable.)
The result of these manipulations is that T I is a universal subtheory of EC L + S, as we made sure all existential quantifiers needed are witnessed (piecewise) by terms. Thus, T I is in fact included in S, i.e., I is an interpretation of T in S which satisfies all the requirements.
Finally, let T be an r.e. theory in a finite language. We have shown that if T is interpretable in a consistent existential theory, there is a quantifier-free unrelativized one-piece parameter-free interpretation of T in a consistent extension of EC L2 , where L 2 consists of a constant and a binary function. (The interpretation is automatically recursive, as the language is finite.) The universal Henkin expansion T H of T is still r.e., and we can assign the Henkin constants in a recursive way to new constants added to L 2 so that we get an interpretation I with the same properties of T H in a consistent extension of EC L , where L consists of a binary function and countably many constants, and I is recursive. The cointerpretation from Lemma 4.3 is also recursive, hence we can reduce the language back to L 2 . Then EC L2 + (T H ) I is an r.e. theory, hence by effectiveness of quantifier elimination, it is equivalent to EC L2 + S for an r.e. quantifier-free L 2 -theory S. By the argument above, I is an interpretation of T in S, as (T H ) I is a universal theory.
Remark 4.6 Theorem 4.5 does not extend to ∀∃ theories T . On the one hand, any theory interpretable in a consistent existential theory is locally finitely satisfiable (notice also that any consistent ∃∀ theory in a relational language is locally finitely satisfiable). On the other hand, EC L itself is a ∀∃ theory interpretable in EC L , and if L contains a nonconstant function symbol, then EC L is not locally finitely satisfiable: for example, if we have a unary function F (x), then EC L proves the formula ∀x, y ∃z (z = x ∧ F (z) = y) with no finite model. We note that if L contains only at most unary relations and constants, then EC L and any its consistent extension is an existential theory, and easily seen to be interpretable in REP U for L finite. If L consists of relations and constants, but is not unary, then EC L (i.e., essentially the theory of the random structure) is genuinely ∀∃, but still locally finitely satisfiable, hence interpretable in R for L finite by Visser's Theorem 2.11. 
Classification of EC L
We now proceed to the main results of the paper, showing that certain theories are not interpretable in any existentially axiomatized theory by way of establishing tameness properties of EC L . We will mostly deduce them from the following statement, showing the impossibility of certain configurations in models of EC L .
In order to keep the proof self-contained and accessible to wider audience, we will not use any results on indiscernibles (though they are lurking in our application of Ramsey's theorem).
Recall that a relation R ⊆ X 2 is asymmetric if there are no a, b ∈ X such that R(a, b) ∧ R(b, a).
Theorem 5.1 For any language L and formula ϕ(z, x, y) with lh(x) = lh(y), there is a constant n with the following property. Let M EC L and u ∈ M be such that
Then for every m ∈ ω and an asymmetric relation R on {0, . . . , m − 1},
Proof: By Theorem 3.7 and Lemma 4.1, we may assume L contains no relations, all the tuples have length one, and ϕ is open. Let τ be the number of subterms of ϕ, and τ * = 2 Ramsey's theorem, let n be sufficiently large so that
Fix M EC L , u ∈ M , and {a i : i < n} ⊆ M such that M ϕ(u, a i , a j ) for i < j < n. In order to simplify the notation, we will assume u is given by a constant of L, and write just ϕ(x, y); this does not increase the number of subterms of ϕ. Let S be the set of all subterms t(x, y) of ϕ, and for every i 0 < i 1 < i 2 < i 3 < n, define
Since |S| ≤ τ , tp is a colouring of quadruples of numbers below n by at most τ * colours. Thus, we can find a 7-element homogeneous set H ⊆ {0, . . . , n − 1} for tp; without loss of generality H = {0, . . . , 6}.
Fix a set of variables {y α : α < m}, and put Θ = {t(y α , y β ) : α, β ∈ R, t(x, y) ∈ S}.
If t ∈ Θ, let V (t) denote the set of α < m such that y α occurs in t; note that |V (t)| ≤ 2. A realization of t is an injective mapping r :
Notice that this condition is void if t depends on at most one variable; otherwise it concerns a unique pair α, β . If r is a realization of t, let r(t) ∈ M be the value of the term resulting from t by replacing each variable y α with a r(α) .
A joint realization of a set of terms {t 0 , . . . , t k−1 } ⊆ Θ is an injective mapping r :
) is a realization of t i for i < k. Note that any pair {t, s} ⊆ Θ has a joint realization, as R has no cycles of length at most 2.
If t, s ∈ Θ, and r is a joint realization of t and s, we define t ∼ s ⇐⇒ r(t) = r(s).
The definition of ∼ is independent of the choice of r.
Proof: First, if two joint realizations r, r ′ satisfy
by homogeneity for tp. This condition holds automatically if
• V (t) = {α, β}, V (s) = {β, γ}, where α, β , β, γ ∈ R, or vice versa.
Assume t = t(y α , y β ), s = s(y α , y γ ), where β = γ, and α, β , α, γ ∈ R (the case with β, α , γ, α ∈ R is symmetric). By (10) , it suffices to consider the case where r(α) = r ′ (α) = 0, r(β) = 1, r(γ) = r ′ (γ) = 2, r ′ (β) = 3. Using (10), we have
and the converse implication is symmetric. The remaining case is when V (t) and V (s) are disjoint and nonempty. It suffices to show that if r(t) = r(s) for some joint realization r, there is a constant a ∈ M such that r ′ (t) = a for every realization r ′ of t (whence the same holds for s by symmetry). Assume t depends on two variables y α , y β with α, β ∈ R (the unary case is easier). Using (10), we may assume that the realization r 1 (α) = r(α) − 1, r 1 (β) = r(β) + 1 of t is within bounds, and disjoint from r(V (s)), thus r 1 ∪ (r ↾ V (s)) is a joint realization of t, s ordered in the same way as r. It follows that a r(β) ).
Applying homogeneity, we have
for every 0 < i < j < 6, 0 < k < l < 6. Since every set {i, j, k, l} is order-isomorphic to some not involving 0, 6, we obtain
for all i < j, k < l using homogeneity again. (Claim 5.1.1)
Thus, ∼ is a well-defined relation on Θ. It is clearly reflexive and symmetric. If t ≏ F (t 0 , . . . , t k−1 ) and s ≏ F (s 0 , . . . , s k−1 ) are in Θ, and r is a joint realization of t and s, it is also a joint realization of each {t i , s i }, hence
Claim 5.1.2 ∼ is transitive.
Proof: Assume that t ∼ s ∼ u. If there exists a joint realization r of {t, s, u}, we immediately obtain r(t) = r(s) = r(u), hence t ∼ u. If not, we must have t = t(y α , y β ), s = s(y β , y γ ), u = u(y γ , y α ), where α, β , β, γ , γ, α ∈ R. Applying alternately t ∼ s and s ∼ u, we obtain
hence r(t) = r(u) under the joint realization of t, u such that r(γ) = 2, r(α) = 3, and r(β) = 4.
(This argument in fact shows that with such a cyclic dependency, the values of all three terms are independent of the realization.) (Claim 5.1.2)
Let Ξ ⊆ Θ and {t * : t ∈ Ξ} be as in Definition 3.1 (for empty x). By induction on the definition of t ∈ Ξ, we see that the value of the closed term t * in M coincides with r(t) for any realization r of t. This and the definition of ∼ implies that If b 0 , . . . , b m−1 ∈ M witness this, and α, β ∈ R and i < j ∈ H, we have
for every subformula ψ of ϕ. It follows that
We draw two principal conclusions from Theorem 5.1. For the first one, notice that the theory below is interpretable in the theory R just by taking < for ∈: then (11) is witnessed by x i = i, z = n due to axiom (4).
Corollary 5.2
The theory in the language ∈ axiomatized by the sentences ∃z, x 0 , . . . , x n−1 i<j<n
for all n ∈ ω is not weakly interpretable in EC L , and consequently not interpretable in any consistent existential theory.
Proof: Apply Theorem 5.1 to the formula interpreting x ∈ z ∧ y ∈ z ∧ x = y, and R a chain longer than n.
We can restate this in proper model-theoretic terminology. A theory T is said to eliminate ∃ ∞ (or eliminate infinity) if for every formula ϕ(z, x), there exists n such that for every model M T and a ∈ M , if |ϕ(a, M )| ≥ n, then it is infinite. Specializing this to the theory T eq , this means that for every ϕ(z, x) and ψ(x, y) (where lh(x) = lh(y) = k), there exists n such that for every M T and a ∈ M , if ψ defines an equivalence relation on M k , and ϕ(a, M k ) hits at least n equivalence classes, then it hits infinitely many.
As in Corollary 5.2, an application of Theorem 5.1 to the formula ϕ(z, x) ∧ ϕ(z, y) ∧ ¬ψ(x, y) yields:
eq has elimination of the ∃ ∞ quantifier.
Our second principal conclusion is the following tameness result on EC L :
That is, the theory axiomatized by
for n ∈ ω is not weakly interpretable in EC L , and is not interpretable in any consistent existential theory. Consequently, EC L has the NSOP property, i.e., no theory consistent with EC L interprets a partial order with arbitrarily long chains. On the other hand, it should be stressed that EC L is not that tame, if the language L is sufficiently complicated (note that the observation below also stands in contrast to properties of random relational structures, i.e., EC L with L purely relational, which is a simple theory, thus NTP 2 ).
Proposition 5.6 If L contains an at least binary function symbol, then EC L has TP 2 , hence it is not simple. More generally, any theory weakly interpreting REP TRF (i.e., with a consistent extension that loosely represents trf ) has TP 2 .
Proof: It suffices to show the latter claim. Let F (x, y) be the REP TRF -function representing the recursive function that interprets x as a Gödel number of a finite sequence, and outputs its yth element. Let a i,j = (i, j), and ϕ(x, y 1 , y 2 ) be the formula
Clearly, ϕ(x, a i,j ) ∧ ϕ(x, a i,k ) is inconsistent for j = k. On the other hand, if σ ∈ ω ω , and n ∈ ω, let s be the Gödel number of σ ↾ n. Then ϕ(s, a i,σ(i) ) for all i < n. Thus, the type
The assumption on L in Proposition 5.6 is essential; see Theorem B.1 for more detailed modeltheoretic classification of the theories EC L as L varies. Now, in the most general case when L contains an at least binary function symbol, there is still a gap left between Proposition 5.6 and Corollary 5.4. We can close it by improving Corollary 5.4 from NSOP 3 to NSOP 1 , but the proof will no longer be self-contained: we will rely on a characterization of NSOP 1 theories due to Chernikov and Ramsey [2] using an independence relation in the spirit of the Kim-Pillay theorem.
We will work inside a monster model M of a completion T ⊇ EC L , as in Section 2.4: a κ-saturated, strongly κ-homogeneous model of T , where κ is a cardinal larger than L and all structures we intend to handle; recall that subsets of M of size < κ are called small.
Definition 5.7
If A, B, and C are small tuples (sequences), we say that A is independent from B over C, written as A | ⌣C B, if AC ∩ BC = C , where X denotes the substructure generated by X, and the juxtaposition of two sequences denotes their concatenation. We will often treat these tuples as sets where the context permits, seeing as the definition of | ⌣ does not depend on their ordering.
The definition of A | ⌣C B is stated here in more general circumstances than what is required for [2] (in particular, their characterization only needs the case when C is a small model, i.e., an elementary submodel of the monster). We do it partly because we can-at no additional cost-and partly because we also want the definition to conform to the shape of independence relations from the original Kim-Pillay theorem, which we will use elsewhere in the paper. For the same reason, the next Lemma includes properties of independence relations that are not directly relevant to the characterization from [2] . with relations and functions defined so that they agree with the original structure on BC , and so that f = id C ∪ x is an isomorphism of AC to C ∪ AC C ⊆ D. We can ensure D is a substructure of M (extending BC ) using EC L and κ-saturation. Then A ′ = f (A) has the required properties.
(viii): Let us construct a chain 
using copies of parts of D. We will also write y for elements y ∈ A ′ C, so that x = y if f (x) = y. We define relations and functions on D ′ so that
, and
It is important to note there is no conflict between the two clauses: the intersection of the two targets is C ∪ A C = C ∪ A ′ C, which is asked to be made isomorphic to A via id C ∪ x, and to A ′ via id C ∪ x = id C ∪ f −1 (x); these two requirements are equivalent, as the two mappings commute with the isomorphism f : A → A ′ . Now, using EC L and κ-saturation, we can embed D ′ as a substructure of M extending D. Let
The following is a restatement of Proposition 5.8 in Chernikov and Ramsey [2] .
Theorem 5.9 Let M be a monster model of a complete theory T , and A | ⌣M B an independence relation on small tuples A, B, and small models M T , that satisfies the appropriate restrictions of properties (i), (ii), (iii), (v ), (vi), and (ix ) from Lemma 5.8. Then T is NSOP 1 .
Corollary 5.10
For any language L, EC L is NSOP 1 .
Remark 5.11 Using Theorem 9.1 in [4] , it can be seen that our | ⌣ coincides with the relation of Kim independence.
We mention that Corollary 5.10 was independently discovered by Kruckman and Ramsey [6] , who learned of the problem from an earlier unpublished version of this paper where it was posed as an open problem.
Conclusion
We succeeded in our original goal of separating interpretability of R from representability of recursive functions. More generally, we obtained a criterion for interpretability of ∃∀ theories in existential theories, showing in particular that we may assume such interpretations to be quantifierfree. We believe these results are interesting in their own right, of course, but at the same time we place as much value on the connection between formal arithmetic and model theory that it revealed: while model-theoretic methods are often used in the study of arithmetic, typically this means to work with models of the (fairly strong) theories of arithmetic themselves, which are quite unlike the kind of tame model theory we encountered in this paper. It would be interesting to see if more such connections are waiting to be discovered. 
A Elimination of imaginaries
In this section, we discuss elimination of imaginaries in the theories EC L . We put it here in the appendix as it is rather tangential to our main topic; we only need it in the proof of Theorem 4.5. One way to describe elimination of imaginaries is that, loosely speaking, it allows to replace any interpretation with an interpretation with absolute equality. We recall the proper definition below, along with some important variants of the notion.
Definition A.1 A theory T has elimination of imaginaries (e.i.) if for every M T and e ∈ M eq , there is a tuple b ∈ M such that dcl M eq (e) = dcl M eq (b).
T has weak e.i. if for every M T and e ∈ M eq , there is b ∈ M such that b ∈ acl M eq (e) and e ∈ dcl M eq (b).
T has Galois e.i. if for every M T , a ∈ M , and e ∈ acl M eq (a), there is b ∈ M such that dcl M eq (ae) = dcl M eq (ab).
As a special case, for any k, l > 0 let ∼ k,l be the equivalence relation on injective l-tuples of k-tuples (represented as kl-tuples) defined by
) with a tuple b ∈ M , then T has coding of finite sets. See [1] for an exposition of various forms of e.i.; in particular, T has e.i. iff it has weak e.i. and coding of finite sets.
It would be nice if EC L had e.i., however this is too good to be true: as we will prove shortly, the theory does not have coding of finite sets. Proof: Let M EC L , and X be a set disjoint from M . An L M -term in variables X is reduced if it has no constant subterms other than M -constants; that is, variables and M -constants are reduced, and if t 1 , . . . , t k are reduced terms, and F is a k-ary function symbol of L, then F (t 1 , . . . , t k ) is reduced unless all the t i are M -constants. Let R be the model whose domain is the set of all reduced terms, with realizations of relations the same as in M (i.e., unsatisfied by tuples involving any non-constant terms), and functions realized in the obvious way. Let N be an e.c. extension of R. Since every permutation of X extends to an automorphism of R fixing M , any tuples of distinct elements x 1 , . . . , x k and x ′ 1 , . . . , x ′ k of X satisfy the same atomic formulas with parameters from M . Thus in N , X is a totally indiscernible set over M by quantifier elimination.
Proposition A.4 Neither EC L nor any its completion has coding of unordered pairs of elements, and a fortiori elimination of imaginaries.
Proof: Let N be a model of EC L with {a, b} a 2-element totally indiscernible set satisfying the property from Lemma A.3. Without loss of generality, N is strongly ω-homogeneous. Assume for contradiction that there is a tuple u in N interdefinable with the representation of {a, b} (that is, with the element a, b /∼ 1,2 of N eq ). By Lemma A.2, all elements of u are in the submodel generated by a, b, hence they are given by a tuple of terms t(a, b). By a, b ≡ b, a and homogeneity, there is an automorphism f such that f (a) = b and f (b) = a; since f preserves {a, b}, it also preserves u, hence t i (a, b) = t i (b, a). Using the extra property, this can only happen if all the t i are closed terms. Thus u, hence {a, b}, is ∅-definable, and a, b ∈ acl N (∅); using Lemma A.2 again, a and b are in fact values of closed terms, but this contradicts a ≡ b.
Short of full e.i., the next best thing we can hope for is weak e.i. This will turn out to hold for EC L , and thankfully it is still enough for our intended application.
Let us work again in a monster model M of a completion of EC L . Recall the following characterization [1, Facts 1.2]: weak e.i. holds iff for every relation R definable with parameters in M, there exists a smallest algebraically closed set defining R. (By Lemma A.2, algebraically closed set = substructure for us.) We observe easily that EC L satisfies a somewhat weaker property:
Lemma A.5 For any definable relation R(x), the class of substructures that define R is directed. That is, if R is definable over b, and over c, it is also definable over b ∩ c .
Proof: In order to simplify the notation, we will omit bars over finite tuples.
Put A = b ∩ c . By saturation, it suffices to show that
Assume that
Claim A.5.1 
Finally, to prove (12), let
Incidentally, the previous lemma implies another variant of e.i.: 
We can reformulate this as follows: if E is an equivalence relation (on k-tuples) definable over A with finitely many equivalence classes, then all the equivalence class are individually definable over A. So, let us fix a k-tuple x, we will show that the equivalence class of x is A-definable. Assume that E has n classes. By repeated use of Lemma 5.8 (vii), we can find a sequence {x i : i ≤ n} of tuples such that x ≡ A x i , and x i | ⌣A x 0 . . . x i−1 x. By the pigeonhole principle, there exist 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n such that x i and x j are in the same class C of E. It follows that C is definable over Ax i and over Ax j , hence by Lemma A.5, it is definable over Ax i ∩ Ax j = A , i.e., over A.
It may come as anticlimactic that we will state the result we are most interested in, viz. weak e.i. for EC L , without proof: while the author has figured out a long and cumbersome argument, it was independently shown in an easier way by Kruckman and Ramsey [6, §3.4], and we invite the interested reader to consult their paper.
Theorem A.7 For any language L, EC L has weak elimination of imaginaries.
We end this section by stating explicitly the consequence of Theorem A.7 for definable functions of EC eq L that we will need in the proof of Theorem 4.5. While it is somewhat hairy to formulate, it follows by a simple compactness argument.
there are formulas {α i (x) : i < n} for some n > 0, and for each i < n, tuples of terms t i,j (x), j < m, such that T proves that {α i : i < n} define a partition of α (i.e., α(x) ↔ i<n α i (x), and
for j = j ′ follows from the rest, specifically α(x) implies that there are at least m tuples satisfying β(u, x).
We will prove the statement by induction on m. If m = 0, there is nothing to prove. Assuming the result holds for m, we will prove it for m + 1.
By Lemma A.2 and a compactness argument, there are tuples of terms t i,m (x), i < n, such
.
we have a partition of α into formulas α i such that T proves
Let us write
Using the induction hypothesis, we can further refine the partition so that there are tuples of terms t i,j (x), j < m, such that
Proposition A.9 Let T ⊇ EC L , and E be an equivalence relation on k-tuples definable in T . Then there are
• integers n > 0, r > 0, and m i ≥ 0 for i < n,
• formulas ϕ i (x) for i < n, and
where t i,j (x) denotes the tuple t i,j l (x) : l < r , and the following condition hold: • The formulas ϕ i form a partition, i.e., T proves i<n ϕ i (x), and ϕ i (x) → ¬ϕ i ′ (x) for i = i ′ .
• On each part ϕ i , the tuples t i,j are pairwise distinct, i.e.,
for each i < n, and j < j ′ < m i .
Proof: By Theorem A.7, for each M T and an equivalence class e of E, there is a real tuple a ∈ M such that a ∈ acl M eq (e), and e ∈ dcl M eq (a). Thus, for each such M , e, and a, we can find a formula ψ(u, x) and an integer m ≥ 1 such that:
• ψ(a, x) for all x ∈ e.
• ψ(u, x) → ψ(u, y) ↔ E(x, y) ; that is, for a given u, the set {x : M ψ(u, x)} is either empty, or an equivalence class of E.
• For a given x, there are either none or exactly m tuples u such that ψ(u, x).
Using a compactness argument, there is a finite partition coarser than E definable in T by formulas {ϕ i (x) : i < n}, and for each i < n, there is a formula ψ i (u, x), and an integer m i ≥ 1, such that T proves:
For a given i, if the tuple u in ψ i (x, u) has length 0, then ϕ i (x) is equivalent to ψ i (x), and it defines a single equivalence class of E; in this case, we formally replace ψ i with an always false formula using a dummy variable u, and put m i = 0. In this way, we may ensure that all the u are nonempty; by repeating one of its elements, we may in fact assume that they all have the same length l > 0 independent of i. Using Lemma A.8, after possibly refining the partition {ϕ i : i < n}, we can find tuples of terms t i,j (x) such that T proves
This implies (13), that is,
Indeed, {t i,j (x) : j < m i } = {u : ψ i (u, x)}, and similarly for y. The properties of ψ i ensure that if E(x, y), these sets are equal, whereas if not (which can only happen if m i > 0), they are disjoint, hence distinct.
B Dependence on language
The results in Section 5 give fairly tight model-theoretic classification of EC L (NSOP 1 , but TP 2 ) in the case that L includes at least one at least binary function symbol. However, the theories behave in different ways for other languages L; in this section, we summarize the main model-theoretic properties of the theories EC L in dependence on L.
Theorem B.1 Let L be a language. Then any complete extension of EC L is (i) strongly minimal iff L consists of nullary symbols;
(ii) totally transcendental iff L consists of nullary symbols, and either finitely many unary relations, or one unary function;
(iii) superstable iff L consists of at most unary symbols, at most one of which is a unary function;
(iv ) stable iff it has NIP iff L consists of at most unary symbols;
(v ) supersimple iff L consists of relations, constants, and at most one unary function;
(vi) simple iff it has NTP 2 iff L consists of relations and at most unary functions;
(vii) NSOP 1 .
Proof: We may assume L contains no nullary relations, as these are fixed to true or false in any complete extension. First, we establish the right-to-left implications. (i) is obvious.
(ii): We may assume L is countable, we will verify EC L is ω-stable. Let M EC L , and A ⊆ M be a set of parameters, which we may assume to be a submodel. If L consists of constants and finitely many unary relations P i (x), a type tp(b/A) of an element b / ∈ A is determined by {i : P i (b)}, hence there are only finitely many (plus |A| trivial types for b ∈ A). If L consists of constants and a unary function F (x), tp(b/A) is determined by the least n such that F n (b) ∈ A and the value of F n (b), or in case there is no such n, by the shape of the chain {F n (b) : n < ω}. This makes |A| + ℵ 0 possibilities.
2 : Assume L consists of constants, unary relations {P i (x) : i ∈ I}, and one unary function F (x). Let A ⊆ M EC L be a submodel, and b ∈ M . Similarly to the ω-stable case, tp(b/A) is determined by the type of b over A in the relation-free reduct of M , for which there are |A| + ℵ 0 possibilities, and by { i, n : i ∈ I, n < ω, (iv): If L contains an at least binary function, it is even TP 2 . If L contains an at least binary relation, wlog P (x, y), then the formula P (x, y) has IP, as every finite model embeds into any model of EC L .
(iii): We may assume L is unary, lest the theory is not even stable. So, assume L contains two unary functions F (x), G(x). Let κ be an arbitrarily large cardinal such that κ ω > κ, M EC L , and A = {a α : α < κ} ⊆ M of cardinality κ. For every σ : ω → κ, the type
over A is consistent, and p σ and p τ are incompatible for σ = τ . Thus, |S 1 (A)| ≥ κ ω , and T is not κ-stable.
(ii): We may assume T is superstable. If L contains a function F (x), and a relation P (x), the 2 ω types
for I ⊆ ω witness that the F, P -fragment of T is not ω-stable, hence T is not totally transcendental. If L contains infinitely many predicates P n (x), n < ω, we can likewise use the types
If L contains a non-nullary (wlog unary) predicate P (x), then both P (M ) and its complement are infinite for any M EC L , thus M is not minimal. Likewise, if L contains a function F (x), the formula F (x) = x defines an infinite set with infinite complement.
Apart from tameness properties from classification theory, we also discuss some more elementary invariants of the theories, namely the number of types, and the number of complete extensions. We only consider countable languages for the rest of this section.
Recall that a countable complete theory is called small if it has countable many complete n-types for all n ∈ ω; this holds if and only if it has a saturated countable model. Proposition B.2 Let L be countable, and T a complete extension of EC L .
(i) Let L consist of relations and constants, where the number of non-nullary relations and T -unequal constants is finite. Then T is ω-categorical.
(ii) Let L consist either of nullary symbols and one unary function, or of nullary relations, finitely many unary relations, and infinitely many T -unequal constants. Then T has ℵ 0 complete n-types for each 0 < n < ω, hence it is not ω-categorical, but it is small.
(iii) Otherwise T has 2 ω complete 1-types.
Proof: (i): By quantifier elimination, there are only finitely many formulas in n variables for every n (ignoring sentences).
(ii): On the one hand, if F is a unary function, there are infinitely many incompatible 1-types of the form
If {c i : i < ω} are provably pairwise distinct constants, then we have infinitely many 1-types extending x = c i .
On the other hand, T is ω-stable by Theorem B.1.
(iii): If we have a unary function F (x), and a nonnullary relation (wlog unary) R(x), we have countably many independent atomic formulas R(F n (x)), thus 2 ω 1-types. Likewise, if there is another unary function G(x), the formulas G(F n (x)) = x are independent, and if we have a binary (or more) function H(x, y), we can consider the formulas H(s 1 (x), s n (x)) = x, where s 1 (x) := H(x, x), and s n+1 (x) := H(x, s n (x)). If there are infinitely many proper predicates, or an at least binary predicate and infinitely many distinct constants, we are also done.
Corollary B.3 Let L be countable.
(i) EC L is complete iff L contains no nullary symbols, or consists of one constant.
(ii) If L contains no constants, and its nullary relations are finitely many, then EC L has finitely many complete extensions.
(iii) If L is finite, and contains no nonconstant functions, then EC L has finitely many complete extensions.
(iv ) If L consists of a unary function, and finitely many nullary symbols, at least one of which is a constant, then EC L has countably infinitely many complete extensions.
(v ) Otherwise EC L has 2 ω complete extensions.
Proof: (i): It is easy to see that in the other cases, there is at least one nontrivial atomic sentence.
(ii)-(v): If there are infinitely many nullary relations or constants, there are infinitely many independent atomic sentences, hence 2 ω complete extensions. Assume there are only finitely many nullary symbols, and let L 0 be L minus constants. The only atomic sentences in L 0 are nullary relations, hence EC L0 has finitely many complete extensions. If L has k > 0 constants, then completions of EC L correspond to complete k-types over completions of EC L0 . By Proposition B.2, these are finitely many if L 0 is finite and contains no functions, ℵ 0 if L 0 consists of one unary function and nullary predicates, and 2 ω otherwise.
Let us touch upon a somewhat different topic now. In Section 3, we proved the existence of the model completion EC L in a laborious way by, essentially, computing an explicit finite axiomatization of resultants. Model theorists are not very keen on getting their hands dirty with actual formulas, and prefer higher-level methods; in particular, a very popular technique for construction of model completions is using Fraïssé limits. For example, if L is a finite relational language, one can show the existence of EC L quite easily by taking the theory of the Fraïssé limit of the class of all finite L-structures. The reader may wonder why we did not use this method as well, thus we will have a look at what we can achieve with Fraïssé limits in our situation. Let us first recall the basic setup.
Definition B.4 The age of a structure M is the class of all finitely generated structures embeddable in M .
A Fraïssé class is a class K of finitely generated countable structures satisfying the following conditions:
• K contains only countably many structures up to isomorphism.
• Hereditary property (HP): if a finitely generated structure B embeds in A ∈ K, then B ∈ K.
• Joint embedding property (JEP): for any finite set {B 0 , . . . , B n−1 } ⊆ K, there exists A ∈ K such that each B i embeds in A.
• Amalgamation property (AP): for any C, B 0 , B 1 ∈ K and embeddings g i : C → B i (i = 0, 1), there exists A ∈ K and embeddings f i :
Note that JEP is equivalent to its special cases n = 0 and n = 2. The former amounts to K = ∅; the latter is, under the assumption of AP and HP, equivalent to the simpler property that K contains only one 0-generated structure up to isomorphism. Note also that if the language is countable, finitely generated structures are automatically countable.
A structure M is ultrahomogeneous if for every finitely generated substructures A, B ⊆ M and every isomorphism f : A ≃ B, there exists an automorphism g of M such that f ⊆ g. Proposition B.5 A class K is a Fraïssé class if and only if it is the age of a countable ultrahomogeneous structure M . In that case, M is unique up to an isomorphism; it is called the Fraïssé limit of K.
Model completions can then be conveniently constructed using Fraïssé limits as follows.
Proposition B.6 Let T be a universal theory in a finite language consisting of relations and constants. If the class of finite models of T has AP and JEP, then it is a Fraïssé class; its Fraïssé limit M is a unique countable e.c. model of T up to isomorphism. The theory of M is the model completion of T .
This works well for EC L when L is a finite language with relations and (by considering separately each quantifier-free diagram) constants. However, it is not applicable if L contains proper functions; this cannot be circumvented by somehow encoding the structures in a relational language, as the theories have fundamentally different properties: in particular, model completions constructed by Proposition B.6 are always ω-categorical, and this seems to be inherent in the method.
Thus, it seems Fraïssé limits are not helpful for showing the existence of EC L in general. Nevertheless, we may still wonder if limits of suitable Fraïssé classes could provide some interesting models of EC L .
Notice that in order to have JEP, whatever class of models we consider must satisfy the same quantifier-free sentences; in view of quantifier elimination of EC L , this amounts to choosing a completion of EC L . So, let L be a countable language, and T a complete extension of EC L . We can write T = EC L + Diag(M 0 ), where M 0 is a (possibly empty) structure whose every element is the value of a closed term, i.e., M 0 is 0-generated; we denote T 0 = Diag(M 0 ). There are two candidate Fraïssé classes of models of T 0 that immediately spring to mind:
• The class K fg of finitely generated models of T 0 .
• The class K fin of finite models of T 0 .
It is easy to verify that K fg satisfies HP, AP, and JEP. Thus, it is a Fraïssé class iff it contains countably many structures up to isomorphism, which happens iff T is small. (We already characterized when T is small in Proposition B.2.) We leave it to the reader to check that in this case, the Fraïssé limit of K fg is the countable saturated model of T .
Clearly, K fin is nonempty only if M 0 is finite, hence we will assume this for the moment. Again, it is easy to see K fin has HP, AP, and JEP, hence it is a Fraïssé class iff it is countable up to isomorphism. This holds iff L contains only finitely many nonnullary symbols; since the finiteness of M 0 implies there are only finitely many constants up to equality in T 0 , and nullary relations are in T 0 fixed to true or false, we can as well assume without loss of generality that L is finite. The Fraïssé limit of K fin is then described by the following result.
, where M 0 is a 0-generated L-structure, and L and M 0 are finite.
Then T has a prime (equivalently: countable atomic) model, which can be characterized as the unique locally finite (i.e., such that finitely generated submodels are finite) countable model of T , and it can be constructed as the Fraïssé limit of the class of all finite L-structures that extend M 0 .
Proof: By the preceding discussion, K fin is a Fraïssé class, hence it has a Fraïssé limit M . Clearly, M ⊇ M 0 is countable, and locally finite. By general properties of Fraïssé limits (see e.g. [3] ), M is existentially closed in the class of locally finite structures. This in fact implies that M is e.c. in the class of all structures, hence M T : if ϕ(u) is an ∃ 1 formula, u ∈ M , and M ⊆ N ϕ, let
and make it an L-structure by preserving the values of all relations and functions in N where possible, and f
, and every finitely generated submodel of N ′ is included in N ′ M plus a finitely generated submodel of M , hence N ′ is locally finite. Thus, M ϕ(u). Every locally finite M ′ T is atomic: let a ∈ M ′ , and A be the submodel of M ′ generated by a. Write A {a} = {b i : i < m}. Then tp(a) is generated by ∃y 0 , . . . , y m−1 Diag(A), where Diag(A) is written using variables x, y in place of a, b.
Thus, M is a countable atomic, hence prime, model of T , and by uniqueness of prime models, every countable locally finite model of T is isomorphic to M .
There are other cases when T has a prime model: for example, if T is small (see Proposition B.2). In fact, we can give a full description (for countable languages). Recall that a complete countable theory has a prime model if and only if it is atomic. By construction, M ψ(a), hence ψ is consistent. By induction on the length of s, we see that T 0 ⊢ ψ(x) → s(x) = t s(a) (x) for each subterm s of ϕ; it follows easily that T 0 ⊢ ψ(x) → ϕ(x). We claim that ψ is an atom; by quantifier elimination, it suffices to show that it implies the quantifierfree type of a. Thus, let us consider a model M ′ ψ(a ′ ). We may assume M ′ is generated by a ′ . The conjuncts of ψ ensure that the mapping
It is the identity on M 0 , and injective on M M 0 . Since ψ implies ϕ, we have M ′ ϕ(a ′ ). By the minimality of M , this implies |M
On the other hand, assume that none of (i)-(iii) holds. Since M 0 does not validate some axiom of EC L as in Definition 3.6, and all elements of M 0 can be denoted by constant terms, there exists a consistent quantifier-free formula in one variable θ(x) which is not satisfiable in M 0 . Assuming for contradiction that T is atomic, we may choose θ(x) to be an atom.
If L includes infinitely many nonnullary relation symbols, let R(x) be one that does not appear in θ. Then θ(x) ∧ R(x, . . . , x) and θ(x) ∧ ¬R(x, . . . , x) are both consistent, contradicting θ being an atom: taking an arbitrary model M θ(a), we may flip the value of R(a, . . . , a) without affecting M θ(a). By a similar argument, we obtain a contradiction if L contains infinitely many nonconstant function symbols.
The remaining case is that M 0 is infinite, and L includes an at least binary symbol, say, a relation symbol R(x, y) (the case of a function symbol is similar). Fix a model M θ(a). Since M 0 is infinite, we can find c ∈ M 0 , denoted by a closed term t, such that c is not the value of any subterm of θ(a). Then we can flip the value of R(a, . . . , a, c) without affecting M θ(a), hence the formulas θ(x) ∧ R(x, . . . , x, t) and θ(x) ∧ ¬R(x, . . . , x, t) are both consistent, a contradiction.
C More on representation
For completeness, let us present a few counterexamples to possible strengthenings of some of the basic claims in Section 2.2.
First, we mentioned that it is enough to represent a specific dprp, or prf, in a theory in order to show its essential undecidability. In contrast, we will prove that any finite set of trf and rp can be represented in a decidable theory. More generally, it holds even for infinite families of such functions and predicates as long as they are uniformly recursive: here, we call a sequence {F n : n ∈ ω} of recursive functions F n : N kn → N uniformly recursive if the functions n → k n and n, w → F n ((w) 0 , . . . , (w) kn−1 ) are recursive, and similarly for sequences of predicates.
Proposition C.1 Let R be a uniformly recursive sequence of trf and rp. Then there exists a consistent decidable theory T and a recursive numeral sequence σ such that R is representable in T w.r.t. σ.
Proof: Let L be the (recursive) language L R from Definition 2.4, and N, R be the "standard L-model" with domain N and the L-symbols realized by the corresponding elements of R. Then EC L + Diag( N, R ) = EC L + REP R is a decidable complete theory by Corollary 3.8, and it represents R w.r.t. the sequence n → n.
The second example serves two-fold purpose. For one, it exhibits that a recursively axiomatizable (or even decidable) theory may represent a non-recursive predicate w.r.t. a non-recursive sequence of numerals. Second, it shows that representation of rp, or even dprp, does not imply essential undecidability if the sequence of numerals is not recursive. We will first prove a simple version applying to finite languages. Proposition C.2 Let P be a finite set of predicates and disjoint pairs. Then there exists a consistent decidable theory T that represents P (w.r.t. a possibly non-recursive sequence of numerals).
Proof: Since we do not require the elements of P to be recursive to begin with, we may as well extend each disjoint pair to a predicate, thus we will assume P consists of predicates without loss of generality. Let L be the finite relational language corresponding to P. Since EC L is decidable, it has a recursive model M (using the standard Henkin completion procedure; in fact, in this case, it is not difficult to construct the model explicitly). Let T = EC L + Diag(M ), which is a decidable complete theory. Since EC L is ω-categorical, M is (a recursive presentation of) its unique countable model, and the countable structure N, P embeds in M ; let us fix such an embedding σ : n → n, where the elements n ∈ M are identified with the corresponding constants in the language of T . Then all P-predicates are represented in T w.r.t. σ.
We could handle countable sets of predicates and disjoint pairs of bounded arity with a bit of preprocessing, but we will need more work to take care of the general case: in particular, note that EC L is no longer ω-categorical (or even small) if L is an infinite relational language; we will use a slightly different theory instead.
Let L 0 be the language that includes an n-ary relation R n (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) for every n ≥ 1, and T 0 be the universal L 0 -theory axiomatized by R n (x) → i<j<n x i = x j for each n. The class K of finite models of T 0 is easily seen to have HP, AP, and JEP. Crucially, it contains only countably many nonisomorphic structures: in fact, for any n, there are only finitely many T 0 -structures of size n, as the axioms force all but the first n L 0 -relations to be empty.
Thus, K is a Fraïssé class, and it has a Fraïssé limit M . Since any isomorphism between finite submodels of M extends to an automorphism of M , and there are finitely many isomorphism types of such submodels of fixed size, it follows that the theory T * of M is ω-categorical, and has elimination of quantifiers. Since all finite(ly generated) models of T 0 embed in M , T * is in fact the model completion of T 0 .
It is not difficult to explicitly axiomatize T * by suitable extension axioms, thus T * is recursively axiomatizable, and in fact, decidable (as it is complete). Moreover, M may be presented as a recursive structure. Thus, its elementary diagram T * M = T * + Diag(M ) is a decidable theory. We will now show that every predicate and disjoint pair (with no recursivity assumption) is representable in T * M , using various (mostly nonrecursive) sequences of numerals. In fact, any countable set of predicates and disjoint pairs can be represented w.r.t. the same sequence of numerals: Proposition C.3 Every countable set P of predicates and disjoint pairs is representable in the decidable theory T * M .
Proof: As in the proof of Proposition C.2, we will assume P to consist of predicates. Without loss of generality, we may also assume that P is closed under identification of variables: i.e., if P ∈ P is n-ary, and i < j < n, the (n − 1)-ary predicate P i,j defined by P i,j (x 0 , . . . , x n−2 ) ⇐⇒ P (x 0 , . . . , x j−1 , x i , x j , . . . , x n−2 ) is in P. Let us also define P ′ (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) ⇐⇒ P (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) ∧ i<j<n x i = x j .
Then we can reconstruct P from P ′ and predicates of smaller arity as P (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) ⇐⇒ P ′ (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) ∨ i<j<n x i = x j ∧ P i,j (x 0 , . . . , x j−1 , x j+1 , . . . , x n−1 ) , hence by induction on the arity, we see that all P-predicates are quantifier-free definable from predicates from P ′ = {P ′ : P ∈ P}. Thus, without loss of generality, we may replace P with P ′ , i.e., we may assume that all predicates P ∈ P satisfy
We may also assume P contains predicates of every arity n ∈ N.
For each n ∈ N, let us fix an enumeration {P n,m : m ∈ N} of all n-ary predicates from P such that each such predicate occurs more than n times in the enumeration. Finally, for each n ≥ 1, we define P n (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) ⇐⇒ P n−1,x0 (x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ) ∧ i>0 x i = x 0 .
The structure N, P n : n ≥ 1 is a countable model of T 0 , hence it embeds in M . Let us fix such an embedding σ : n → n, where we identify n ∈ M with the corresponding constant in the language of T * M . Thus, σ serves as a sequence of numerals, and each relation P n is represented in T * M w.r.t. σ by the formula R n (x). It follows that each P ∈ P is represented in T * M as well: if P is n-ary, let us fix distinct m 0 , . . . , m n ∈ N such that P = P n,m0 = · · · = P n,mn . By the pigeonhole principle, all the numbers m 0 , . . . , m n cannot simultaneously appear in any tuple satisfying P ; thus, the formula j≤n R n+1 (m j , x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ).
represents P (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) in T * M w.r.t. σ. The main result of this paper shows that representability of prf does not imply interpretability of R. Another problem in a similar vein is to clarify the relationship between representability of different types of recursive objects. Specifically, let us consider the following conditions on a theory T :
(i) The set RP is representable in T .
(ii) The set DPRP is representable in T .
(iii) The set RP ∪ {succ} is representable in T .
(iv) The set DPRP ∪ {succ} is representable in T .
(v) The set TRF is representable in T .
(vi) The set PRF is representable in T .
We discuss separately the cases with the successor function included because of pathologies exhibited by representation of predicates and disjoint pairs w.r.t. potentially non-recursive sequences of numerals, as seen in Proposition C.3.
As we already mentioned in Section 2.2, it is easy to see that (vi) → (v), (iv) → (iii), (ii) → (i), (vi) → (iv) → (ii), and (v) → (iii) → (i). We wish to show now that no other implications between these six conditions hold in general. This turns out not to be quite true-once again due to pathologies exhibited by non-recursive sequences of numerals. In the spirit of battering reality vigorously until it complies with our preformed expectations, we fix this by considering a more strict notion of implication between representability of classes R 0 and R 1 , namely: does representability of R 0 in T w.r.t. a sequence of numerals σ imply the representability of R 1 w.r.t. σ? This leads to the desired answer.
Proposition C.4
(i) There exists a theory that represents DPRP ∪ {succ}, but does not represent TRF.
(ii) There exists a theory that represents TRF, but does not represent DPRP ∪ {succ}.
(iii) There exists a theory that represents DPRP, but does not represent succ.
(iv ) Every theory that represents RP also represents arbitrary countable sets of predicates and disjoint pairs.
(v ) There exists a theory that represents TRF w.r.t. a sequence of numerals σ, but does not represent DPRP w.r.t. σ.
Proof: If R ⊆ PRF ∪ DPRP, let EC REP R = EC LR + REP R , where L R is the language of REP R . (i): Let R = DPRP + {succ}. Then the theory EC REP R represents R, and it is supersimple (hence NTP 2 ) by Theorem B.1. In contrast, any theory representing trf is TP 2 by Proposition 5.6.
(ii): The (complete) theory T = EC REP TRF represents trf. Let P = P + , P − be a recursively inseparable dprp. We claim that T cannot represent {P, succ}, i.e., it does not interpret REP P,succ : if it did, then REP P,succ would be also interpretable in a finite-language fragment T 0 of T , which would make T 0 an essentially undecidable theory. However, T 0 is of the form EC REP R for a finite R ⊆ TRF, thus it is decidable as in the proof of Proposition C.1.
(iii): The theory T = EC REP DPRP represents dprp. Assume for contradiction that it represents succ, i.e., it interprets REP succ . Then REP succ is interpretable in a finite-language fragment T 0 of T , which is an extension of EC L for L a finite language with relations and constants. Thus, (any completion of) T 0 is ω-categorical. It follows that REP succ also has an ω-categorical extension, but this is impossible, as it has infinitely many definable constants.
(iv): The argument from the proof of Proposition C.3 shows that every countable set P of predicates and disjoint pairs is representable (w.r.t. a suitable sequence of numerals) in any theory that represents all predicates definable in the model M .
(v): The theory T = EC REP TRF represents trf w.r.t. the sequence of numerals n. If it also represented DPRP w.r.t. the same numeral sequence, it would in fact represent DPRP ∪ {succ}, which we already know to be impossible from (ii).
